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THE COMMrITEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
WHO PAYS?
Roger S. Clark* and Felice D. Gaer'"
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
With the United Nations in financial crisis, the question
"who pays?" is becoming crucial for the survival of oversight
mechanisms for a whole range of United Nations human rights
treaties. Who pays was the last item remaining to be decided
as the Convention on the Rights of the Child was before the
Third Committee of the General Assembly in 1989. During
the drafting various funding models from other human rights
treaties were hotly debated and the Assembly ultimately
adopted a system under which all the costs of the Committee
are to be met from the general United Nations budget.1 We
believe that this was the best possible outcome of the debate.
While each of the possible systems has weaknesses, which we
will discuss, funding from the regular budget is the best hope
for survival of the treaty regime.
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law - Camden. B.A., 1964, Victoria
University of Wellington (New Zealand); LL.M., 1967, Victoria University of Wellington (New
Zealand); LLM., 1968, Columbia University; J.S.D., 1972, Columbia University. Member,
United Nations Committee on Crime Prevention and Control; Vice-President, International
League for Human Rights.
** Executive Director, International League for Human Rights. B.A., 1968, Wellesley;
M.A., 1971, Columbia; M. Phil., 1973, Columbia.
1. This is the effect of The Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. A/441736
art. 43, paras. 11 and 12 (1989):
11. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the
necessary staff and facilities for the effective performance of the functions
of the Committee under the present Convention.
12. With the approval of the General Assembly, the members of the
Committee established under the present Convention shall receive
emoluments from United Nations resources on such terms and conditions
as the Assembly may decide.
On the role of the Committee, see Cynthia Price-Cohen's article Juvenile Justice Provisions
of the Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child supra, at 3.
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1[. WHAT CATEGORIES OF COSTS ARE INVOLVED
The costs of the supervisory mechanism in this and
similar treaties include the expenses of the committee
meetings, such as travel, per diem, and honorarium (if any)
for the members. Additionally, there are also the substantial
costs associated with paper flow, including reproduction and
translation of reports and other documents. There are
conference services meeting support costs including rooms,
simultaneous translation, summary records or a rapporteur's
precis. Finally, there is the preparation and reproduction of
a Report of the Committee to the General Assembly. Such
bureaucratic expenses far exceed those of simply assembling
the members of the relevant treaty committees.
III. PAST UNITED NATIONS EXPERIENCE
A. Three models of Treaty Committee Financing
There are three main models in United Nations
practice that deal with the practicalities of sharing human
rights treaty supervisory costs, those of the Committee on the
Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD),
the Human Rights Committee (HRC), and the Committee
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT).
2
1. The CERD Model
The first operative United Nations supervisory
committee was the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) established under the International
Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial
2. For further elaboration, see Human Rights - Methods Applied Under Different Human
Rights Instruments as Regards Their Financial Implications, U.N. Doc. E/1988/85 (1988).
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Discrimination? The Convention provides in Article 8,
paragraph 6 that "States Parties shall be responsible for the
expenses of members of the Committee while they are in
performance of Committee duties."4 Article 1.0, paragraph 3
provides, however, that the Secretary-General of the United
Nations shall provide the necessary staff and facilities of the
committee.' The CERD does not Specify who pays for such
things as secretarial services, but implies that such costs are to
be included in the general budget of the Center for Human
Rights and the Division of Conference Services. In fact, this
is what occurs.
Thus under CERD there is some cost sharing. For
example, the Committee members' expenses are to be paid by
the States Parties while the paper flow and conference costs
are to be paid by the United Nations. Although we have not
fully analyzed all aspects of the United Nations budget, lain
Guest6 seems substantially accurate in asserting that: "[t]he
CERD costs roughly $1.6 million a year to service. Of this,
90% is financed from the United Nations regular budget, and
the remaining 10% by its [128] members, whose annual
contributions range from $6,000 (West Germany) to $346
(Burkina Faso)."7
2. The HRC Model
There is no cost sharing feature for the Human Rights
Committee (HRC) which is the supervisory committee for the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.' As with
3. G.A. Res. 2106 A (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 21) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965).
4. Id. at 49.
5. Id.
6. Guest, Chaos Threatens UN Treaties, 12 HUM. RTS. INTERNET REP. 106 (1988).
7. Id. at 106-07.
8. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
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several other treaty committees,9 the entire cost of the HRC
is borne by the United Nations. Article 35, of the
International Covenant states that "[t]he Members of the
Committee shall, with the approval of the General Assembly
of the United Nations, receive emoluments from the United
Nations resources on such terms and conditions as the
General Assembly may decide, having regard to the
importance of the Committee's responsibilities. '"1 Moreover,
Article 36, requires the Secretary-General to "provide the
necessary staff and facilities for the effective performance of
the functions of the Committee .... "" None of these costs
are charged back to the States Parties.
3. The CAT Model
The third model of human rights treaty financial
provisions is found in the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. 2 Article 17, paragraph 7 of that convention
provides that "[Sltates Parties shall be responsible for the
expenses of members of the Committee while they are in
performance of Committee duties."'3 Article 18, paragraph 3
obligates the Secretary-General of the United Nations to
provide "the necessary staff and facilities for the effective
9. The Committee (CESCR) set up by the ECOSOC under the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted by the same resolution) operates
functionally the same way as the Human Rights Committee. Id. at 51-52. The Committee
set up under the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid operates in a similar manner. G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 30) at 75-76, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973). The Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women contains in Article 17, paras. 8 and 9, language
concerning its committee (CEDAW) which is verbatim with that in the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) 193, 197, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (1979).
10. O.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 56, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
11. Id. at 56.
12. G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984).
13. Id. at 199.
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functions of the Committee."'" However, Article 18, paragraph
5 shifts these costs as well to the States Parties." "The States
Parties shall be responsible for expenses incurred in
connection with the holding of meetings of the States Parties
and of the Committee, including reimbursement to the United
Nations for any expenses, such as the cost of staff and
facilities, incurred by the United Nations pursuant to
paragraph 3 . *.". ."" Thus, in this model, unlike the other
two, all expenses are borne by the States Parties.
B. The Models in Practice
1. The CERD Model
The CERD model's cost-sharing provisions, with States
Parties paying for the Committee's travel and expenses, and
the United Nations paying the rest, has run into serious
problems. Since 1986, non-payment of assessments has led to
cancellation and curtailment of CERD meetings, and some
diversion of CERD sessions from a discussion of substantive
matters to fiscal problems. 7 Financial uncertainties have
raised basic questions about CERD's ability to continue to
meet and function effectively.
With 128 States Parties, CERD involves more of the
world's nations than any other human rights treaty.' CERD
is scheduled to meet twice a year, for three weeks each, to




17. -Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 42 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 18) at 5-7, U.N. Doc. A142/18 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 CERD Report]; Report of
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18)
at 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/43/18 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 CERD Report]; and Report of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 8-
10, U.N. Doc. A/44/18 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 CERD Report].
18. 1989 CERD Report, supra note 17, at 8.
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an optional procedure. 9 However, over the years, many
States Parties have not paid their assessed contributions.
Until the end of 1985, the United Nations General Fund was
able to fill the gap pending receipt of the arrears.'
With the United Nations financial crisis in 1986, this
practice came to an end. In January 1986, States Parties, at
their 10th meeting, took measures to reduce travel expenses
of Committee members, appealed for help from the Secretary-
General and asked parties to pay what they owed. 1
Some responses were forthcoming, but by mid-June, the
shortfall of States obligations, considered together with the
overall fiscal United Nations crisis, was sufficient to require
"deferment" of CERD's August 1986 session.' Various urgent
appeals over the course of the next year reduced the arrears
from $262,611 (on June 16, 1986) to $159,319 (as of July 31,
1987).23 By September 30, 1987, the shortfall was reduced to
$151,623.24 Even this was not enough to convene a
Committee meeting. However, the Secretary-General again
advanced funds from the United Nations General Fund for
the March 1987 meeting and later enabled a one week session
in August.' At the shortened session, Committee members
questioned whether the outstanding financial requirement was
the real source of the problems it faced in meeting. They
noted that some of the countries were delinquent not only in
paying, but also in reporting.' The problem continues.
A close examination of outstanding assessments and
outstanding reports over the past three years reveals several
19. 1987 CERD Report, supra note 17, at 3.
20. Id. at 5-8.
21. Id. at 5.
22. id.
23. Id. at 5-7.
24. See "Statement by Jan Martenson," Under-Secretary-General for Human Rights before
the Third Committee of the General Assembly, October 5, 1987 (on file at the New York
Law School Journal of Human Rights). By 1988, it was again up to $172,560. 1988 CERD
Repor supra note 17, at 105.




points that shape our evaluation of the self-financing
mechanisms of the CERD:
1. Many countries are in arrears, with most from the third
world and only a few from the Eastern bloc or Western
countries.
All outstanding assessments, as of July 31, 1987, except
one, came from third world countries. Other than Romania,
no "western" or "eastern" bloc states party owed money to
CERD. In 1988, however, two Western states, Canada and
Luxembourg, fell into arrears,2 but then paid up. In 1989,
Canada and the UK in the West were joined by Hungary and
Czechoslovakia on the list of 73 delinquent countries.2
2. The amounts involved are trivial sums individually but they
add up.
In 1987 and 1988, no country owed more than Bolivia
with a total due of $9,82330 and $10,169.31 After Bolivia paid
up, Mali topped the list in 1989 at $8,502.32 Most countries
owe dramatically less. In fact one-half of the 73 countries in
arrears owe less than $1,000.
33
3. One-third (or less) of the countries in arrears account for
approximately three-fourths of the cash shortfall.m
27. 1987 CERD Report, supra note 17, 178.
28. 1988 CERD Report, supra note 17 at 57-58.
29. 1989 CERD Report, supra note 17, at 104-05.
30. 1987 CERD Report, supra note 17, at 178.
31. 1988 CERD Report, supra note 17, at 57-58.
32. 1989 CERD Report, supra note 17, at 104-05.
33. Id.
34. Based on material in the 1987 CERD Report, supra note 17, at 178; 1988 CERD Report,
supra note 17, at 57-58; 1989 CERD Report, supra note 17, at 104-05.
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4. There is no clear-cut correlation between financial
delinquency and reporting delinquency.
Of the countries with the most outstanding reports and
which have received the most reminders, most (but not all)
fall in the top twenty countries in financial arrears.
In 1987, of the nine countries with greatest financial
arrears, three were up-to-date on their reporting, four owed
only one report, and only two (Burundi and Sierra Leone)
owed numerous reports (three and six, respectively). Of the
next eleven countries, all owed a significant number of reports.
However, some countries that were up-to-date on assessments
were among the most delinquent in reporting (e.g. Guyana).35
Of the nine in greatest arrears in 1988, Sierra Leone
alone owed seven reports. Among the others, only Burkina
Faso owed more than one. In 1988, three of the countries
owing the most reports - Burundi, Libya, and Niger -
submitted them. Of the three, only Niger paid any part of its
arrears. Several of the countries that owe the most reports
are up-to-date on their payments.
In 1989, the picture again lacked consistency. The
same countries remained at the top of the delinquency list in
1989 as in 1988. For each that had a high arrearage and
many outstanding overdue reports, there was another country
with many reports due but no significant arrearage37
CERD's meeting schedule has been severely disrupted
because of financial uncertainties and non-payment: its twice
annual meetings of three weeks each have not taken place.
In 1986, "owing to the non-payment of the assessed
contributions by a number of States Parties... and the grave
35. The analysis in this paragraph is based on the tables in 1987 CERD Report supra note
17, at 17-21 and 178.
36. The analysis in this paragraph is based on the tables in 1988 CERD Repor, supra note
17, at 11-17 and 57-58.




financial crisis facing the United Nations,"'  CERD's 34th
meeting was cancelled. In 1987, CERD met only once, for
one week;39 in 1988, once for two weeks;' and in 1989, once
for four weeks.4
Discussing finances, and the problems they present to
the Committee's ability to conduct its work under the
convention, the CERD Committee appealed to the 43rd
General Assembly in 1988 to authorize the Secretary-General
to temporarily ensure the financing of Committee expenses
from the regular budget of the United Nations.42 A similar
appeal was made in 1989.4' The General Assembly was not
very responsive in 1988; it noted the disruption of the CERD
meeting schedule, called on states to pay arrearages and speed
current assessments, but did not explicitly call for the regular
United Nations budget to come to the rescue of the CERD.44
In 1989, however, the Assembly took a strong step in the
direction of restoring a more regular work program for
CERD: it invited the Secretery-General "to do everything
possible to ensure that funds are available to meet all the
costs of the Committee's meetings in 1990 . . ,,45 The
financial crisis nonetheless continues unresolved for CERD.
The severity of this problem has been recognized by
some U.N. bodies. For example, the "In-depth Evaluation of
the human rights programme!' conducted by the Committee for
Program and Coordination ("CPC") reached the following
conclusion and recommendation:
121. The experience of the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination has shown
38. Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/41/561 at 3 (1986).
39. 1987 CERD Report supra note 17, at viii.
40. 1988 CERD Report; supra note 17, at 1.
41. 1989 CERD Report, supra note 17, at 5.
42. 1988 CERD Report, supra note 17, at 50.
43. 1989 CERD Report; supra note 17, at 96-97.
44. G.A. Res. 43/96, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 171, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1988).
45. G.A. Res. 44/68, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.--), U.N. Doc. A/44/68 (1989).
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the negative consequences on the functioning of
treaty bodies of financial mechanisms that have
proven to be unreliable.
Recommendation 4.
122. For new instruments being developed,
adequate attention should be given to ensuring
that the supervisory systems will rest upon sound
and viable financing procedures. 6
The Committee seeks to continue to meet until a permanent
solution to its financial problems can be found.47
Thus, even CERD's modest cost-sharing arrangements
can dramatically affect a supervisory committee's ability to
meet and maintain effective oversight of the treaty - whether
in reviewing country performance or building its individual
complaint procedures and related jurisprudence.
2. The HRC Model
Unlike CERD, the Human Rights Committee's full
financial expense is supported by the general United Nations
budget. This has the obvious advantage of assuring some
measure of continuity in its meeting schedule and performance
of its mandate. Under the HRC formula, a few States Parties
cannot easily bring to a halt the entire supervisory Committee
procedure by being in arrears in their assesments. However,
the HRC model does make the Committee entirely dependent
on the "good financial health" of the United Nations and the
budget of its Human Rights Centre. Because decisions on
United Nations Human Rights Centre budget and staffing
matters are normally made by various persons external to the
HRC, such a dependent arrangement can create problems for
the independence of the HRC.
These kinds of problems were highlighted during the
46. U.N. Doc. E/AC.51/1989/2 at 52 (1989).
47. U.N. Press Releases RD/582 and RD/583, 12 August 1988.
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1986 United Nations financial crisis. As the Secretary-General
noted, the United Nations was "confronted by financial
problems of such magnitude as to have profound implications
for the viability of the Organization . . . ."" Among the
responses to this financial crisis, the Secretary-General
recommended that one of the two remaining meetings of the
HRC scheduled for 1986 should be deferred until 1987.49
Moreover, referring to "[t]hree treaty bodies,s° serviced by the
United Nations under rules of procedure adopted by the
bodies themselves, which provide for summary records," he
suggested that because of financial considerations and/or
strains "[t]he General Assembly may wish to request these
bodies to dispense with summary records for. all their
meetings, including meetings of the States parties to each
convention. "51
The ensuing debate in the HRC found its members
somewhat uncomfortable with their place in the scheme of
things. Although the HRC was set up under a separate treaty
and is anxious to maintain its own integrity, it nevertheless
requires the support of the United Nations to function.52
Thus, when the United Nations suffers, the HRC suffers. But
how is the suffering to be apportioned? Mrs. Higgins, the
British member of the Committee who found the discussion
quite depressing, noted that the United Nations was
undergoing a financial crisis, but as a body that was supposed
to have a special status, the Committee should be entitled to
signal its own priorities. The costs should be presented in
real terms and the Committee should be entitled to decide
where its sacrifices should be made.53
48. Current Financial Crisis of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. A/40/1102 at 2 (1986).
49. Id. at 23.
50. The three treaty bodies are: CERD, CEDAW, and HRC. Id. at 24 and Corr. 2 at
2.
51. Id.
52. 28 U.N. CCPR (690th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/SR.690 (1986).
53. Id. at 4-9.
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The HRC was reluctantly forced to come to terms. To
cut costs a session would be cancelled and a meeting would
be held in Geneva (which was purportedly cheaper) rather
than in New York.5" However, on the matter of summary
records, which were viewed by many as the real substance of
the supervision process, there was a problem. Committee
members had never before been confronted with any
budgetary question. Suddenly they had to agree to cost
savings that affected many basic services, such as summary
records, and yet they had no figures or options before them."
The Bureau of the Committee suggested a compromise by
which the summary records would be dispensed with, except
when States Parties reports were being considered and at
other times on a case-by-case basis.5" Mr. Errera, the
Committee member from France, responded that:
[t]he summary records were of vital importance
since they represented the memory of Committee
members, the Committee as an institution,
present and future States Parties, and all those
for whom the Covenant has been elaborated.
Mutilating that memory by cutting summary
records from the HRC budget would weaken the
Committee as rather like an individual who
developed amnesia. 7
After a fait accompli by Conference Services, which
pleaded lack of resources, summary records were dispensed
with for the last two days of the session and it was agreed
that in the future "summary record coverage should be
reduced from three weeks to two per session."58 Significantly,
54. Id. at 10.
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id. at para. 28.
57. 28 U.N. CCPR (696th mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/696 (1986).
58. 28 U.N. CCPR (697th mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/696 (1986).
[VOL VII
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HRC thereafter began to schedule its reviews of country
reports during those two weeks.
The HRC summary records dilemma illustrates the
Committee's financial dependence on the general United
Nations budget. Most Committee members have long felt
that summary records are essential as an indicator of the
Committee's flexibility during its most critical activity. But the
Secretariat has seen matters otherwise. According to the
Controller, summary records are paid for from the conference
services budget, not the human rights program budget.5 ' They
are, in short, not "substantive program outputs," in contrast to
the Committee's annual report to the General Assembly.'
Thus, the financial managers argue, summary records can be
eliminated without reducing the Committee's "substantive"
program. 1
Because of their status as members of an independent
body, however, HRC members have worked out a number of
creative compromises, such as those on summary records, to
ensure that the services most essential to their specialized
treaty-supervisory work are maintained to some degree, even
during a period of austerity.
62
59. Gaer, Financial Crisi at the U.N.: Continued Blows to the Human Rights Programs, 11
HuMAN RIGmS INTERNEr REPORT 58 (1987).
60. id.
61. Id.
62. For examples of similar later problems with the HRC, see U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.880
(1989), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/44/SR.38 at 9 (1989) (dispute about the need - and cost - of holding
meetings in New York). Other treaty bodies based on the HRC model have also been
confronted with the need for cutbacks in meetings and conference services because of the
overall United Nations financial crisis, and have been directed to make certain adjustments.
For example, CEDAW, at its 1987 meeting was informed by the secretariat that while
"entitled" to summary records, these could be prepared in only 2 languages. Report of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
38) at 2-5, 94, U.N. Doc. A/42/38 (1987). When a member asked to see detailed information
about past and present budgets so the Committee could, in turn, make its own views known,
the Committee was told that this was not possible; that the 2 year draft budget had already
been prepared, but some effort would be made to inform members about past practice. Id.
Financial data was later made available concerning only the comparative cost; a New York
meeting would actually cost less (by some $900) than one in Vienna because of the much
cheaper translation, interpretation, and summary records costs in New York. Id. On this
latter point, CEDAW requested, and the General Assembly granted, additional meeting days
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3. The CATModel
The Torture Convention came into force only in June
1987, but the Committee was born in dire straits. Lack of
funds initially meant that the new committee met only for five
working days, instead of three weeks, in 1988. This was a
result of a specific decision of the States Parties at their first
meeting'3 that committee meetings would not convene until
sufficient moneys had been received for that purpose from
States Parties." According to Iain Guest, "the financial
burden could discourage precisely those governments who
practice torture and so most need to join.
65
An important financial issue with serious implications
for the matter of "who pays?" has been raised by the German
Democratic Republic. A main function of the CAT is to
examine reports from parties.' Article 20, of the Convention,
however, permits certain action by the CAT when it "[r]eceives
reliable information which appears to it to contain well-
founded indications that torture is being systematically
practiced in the territory of a State Party."'67 Under Article 28,
a State Party may declare that it does not accept this
jurisdiction of the Committee." On the other hand, Article 21
permits a State Party to recognize the competence of the
Committee to consider complaints by other States that the
Party is not fulfilling its obligations.69 Article 22 of the
in 1988, as an exceptional measure. Id. In view of the substantial backlog of reports to be
reviewed, CEDAW asked the 43rd General Assembly to approve another extension for 1989.
Id. This request was not met.
63. See CAT/SP/SR.1 at paras 54-55 (1987).
64. See also Byrnes, The Committee Against Torture, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS (P. ALSON ed. 1990); J. BURGERS & H. DANELIUS, THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 112-13 (1989).
65. Guest, Conventional Folly, 12 HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNET REP. 92 (1988).
66. Convention Article 19, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1984).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 200.
69. Id. at 199-200.
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Convention permits a state to accept the competence of the
Committee to receive and consider communications from or
on behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to
be victims of a violation by a State Party of the provisions of
the Convention.7'
The German Democratic Republic, which has made the
reservation under Article 28 and declined to accept the
committee's competence under Articles 21 and 22, has taken
further action that complicates the financial picture. In
September 1987, the GDR made a "declaration" amounting to
a reservation "[t]hat it will bear its share only of those
expenses in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 7 and
Article 18, paragraph 5 of the Convention arising from
activities under the competence of the committee as
recognized by the GDR."'" This would preclude payment of its
share of expenses arising from individual or state complaints
against other states. It would mean supporting only the
reviews of country reports. It is very doubtful that it is lawful
to pick and choose what is to be paid for in this way. In any
case, such reservations would clearly have the effect of
nullifying the Convention's and the CAT's functioning.
States Parties from the United Nation's "West
European and Other Group" (WEOG) reportedly made an
informal demarche on the GDR, opposing any such unilateral
financial action.72 Additionally, according to a recent article
by Manfred Nowak,73 when some Western representatives
voiced concerns about the GDR's reservation at the first
meeting of States Parties, they were assured by the GDR
delegate that the GDR would bear its financial share of all
Committee activities.74  Several States ultimately lodged
70. Id. at 200.
71. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary-General Status as at
31 December 1988, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/7 at 179-80 (1989).
72. Guest, U.N. Program Jeopardized by East Europeans, Budgetary Pressure, 12 HuM. RTs.
INTERNET REP. 90 (1988).
73. Nowak, Torture, 12 HUM. RTS. INTERNET REP. 92 (1988).
74. Id.
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objections to the reservation." To date, however, the GDR
declaration has not been withdrawn.
In response to the Secretary-General's decision to
permit the CAT to meet only for a shortened five-day session
in 1988 due to insufficient resources, the Committee formally
asked the Secretary-General to review resource projections
and consider possibilities of convening a second meeting in
1988.76 However, this was neither endorsed nor approved at
the 43rd General Assembly although the Assembly did make
the important statement that it "recognizes the importance of
appropriate administative and financial arrangements to enable
the Committee Against Torture to carry out in an effective
and efficient manner the functions entrusted to it ... and to
ensure the long-term viability of the Committee . . . ."" In
1989, the CAT met twice, in April and November, to begin
reviewing country reports.7" The General Assembly, expressing
its own recognition of the precarious financial arrangements
for CAT and the East German threat, stressed the importance
of "strict adherence" to financial obligations and appealed "to
all States parties not to take any measures that might impair
the financing of all the functions of the Committee under the
Convention . .." It then asked the Secretary General to
"'ensure the provision of appropriate staff and facilities" for its
effective functioning.79
There has been a growing awareness that the financial
arrangement under CAT is insufficient.
IV. CONCLUSION
75. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 71, at 183-85.
76. Report of the Committee Against Torture, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 5, U.N.
Doc. A/43/46 (1988).
77. G.A. Res. 43/132, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.49), U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1988).
78. See Report of the Committee Against Torture, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) 1, 42,
U.N. Doc. A/44/46 (1989).
79. G.A. Res. 44/144, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.--), U.N. Doc. A/44/144 (1989).
[VOL VII
U.N. DRAFT CONVENTION
The issue was which of the three models would be most
suitable for the proposed Committee on the Rights of the
Child. To answer this question it was necessary to consider
the goals of the supervisory committee and the treaty itself.
The goals of the supervisory committee as we see it include:
to provide the most sturdy base for strengthening the regime
of the Convention; to maintain compliance with the
Convention; to assure the independence of the treaty
committee; and, to the extent possible, to avoid overburdening
the United Nations general budget with unnecessary and
redundant expenses. We believe that the best of the available
options was in fact adopted.
None of the models found in past United Nations
practice are perfect. If the States Parties have to pay special
assessments, a number of countries from both the developing
and undeveloped world may not become party to the Treaty.
During the 1988 session of the Working Group on a draft
Convention on the Rights of the Child, for example, "many
participants" expressed concern that many countries would not
ratify the Convention under these terms."0 The third world's
external debt burden was cited as a related factor. Colombia's
delegate specifically discussed the impossibility of Colombia
bearing such added costs.8"
Additionally, as has occurred with CERD and to a
lesser extent CAT, if States do become parties to a convention
which requires additional contributions, they may not pay their
assessments.8 2 On the other hand, if the costs are borne by
the United Nations general budget, the Secretariat can, to a
large extent, determine what services will be made available
to the Committee. However, as HRC experience has shown,
if not checked, such an arrangement can undermine the
independence of the treaty body.
80. Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1988/28 at 25 (1988).
81. Id.
82. See supra notes 17-47 (CERD) and notes 63-79 (CAT).
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We do not find that overburdening the United Nations
general budget with unnecessary expenses is a problem for
human rights treaties. It is certainly not a persuasive reason
for adopting a financial arrangement - support by the States
Parties - that virtually assures that the Convention will stumble
badly.
The promotion and protection of human rights is one
of the four goals specifically mentioned in the United Nations
Charter.' Its importance is paramount. Yet the resources
devoted to achieving the organization's goals in human rights
through various United Nations bodies are minuscule,
(amounting to less than 1 percent of the organization's total
budget).' Rather than burdening the United Nations budget
with unnecessary or redundant costs, support ,for the human
rights treaty bodies would help strengthen the achievement of
one of the United Nations' fundamental goals. It would
advance the institutionalization of human rights into the legal
structures and practices of the world's nations and strengthen
international supervision of this process. The United Nations
should be pleased to contribute to this effort by assisting in
managing the supervisory regimes for the treaties.
A growing sensitivity to the need for better financial
arrangements for the treaty supervisory bodies has developed
in the United Nations in recent years and the debates
surrounding the Convention on the Rights of the Child played
a significant role in this. At an October 1988 meeting of
chairpersons of human rights treaty bodies, "there was
considerable discussion of the difficulties" resulting from the
financial crises of the UN, CERD, and CAT. 5 Participants
noted that the UN had a responsibility to ensure the efficient
functioning of the mechanisms established under the human
83. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
84. See Report of the Committee Programme and Co-ordination, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 37, U.N. Doc. A/44/16 (1989).
85. See Note by the Secretary.Genera Reporting Obligations of States Parties to the United
Nations Instruments on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/44/98 at 20 (1989).
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rights treaties. Further, they concluded that the experience
with the CERD and CAT "suggested that the self-financing
system did not contribute to the effective operation of those
mechanisms or to promoting the acceptance of the obligations
inherent in the instruments."
The significant financial implications of the creation of
future committees (such as that on the rights of the child)
were sufficient, they felt, to merit a study on long-term
approaches to the supervision of existing and new
instruments.8 7
The Commission on Human Rights, in March 1989,
authorized such a study, by Professor Philip Alston of the
Australian National University who is also Rapporteur of the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Professor Alston's Report" - probably the most important
study of the practical operation of the United Nations human
rights treaty system ever undertaken - considers, inter alia, the
array of financial matters facing the treaty committees and the
arguments for each alternative funding approach. He reaches
conclusions similar to our own about funding from the general
United Nations budget being the best of a less-than-desirable
set of alternatives, and makes a number of creative
suggestions for improving the overall situation. 9  The
immediate problem with the drafting of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child has been solved but the problem of
"who pays" remains to bedevil the whole human rights
supervisory program.
86. Id. at 21.
87. Id. at 23.
88. Published as the Annex to Note by the Secretary-Genera Effective Implementation of
International Instruments of Human Rights, Including Reporting Obligations Under International
Instruments on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/44/668 (1989).
89. Id. at 26-40.
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